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Abstract 
Limited research has explored the reasons behind the level of environmental con-
cerns in master plans in China, where serious environmental degradation has caught 
the world’s attention and the planning regime is significantly different from those 
based on representative democracy. Analyzing eighty master plans of China’s large 
municipalities, we find that the education and age of local leaders have a signif-
icant effect on environmental concerns in master plans, while their work experi-
ence and state mandate do not. We conclude that that well-educated local leaders 
and a more collaborative planning approach could deal more efficiently with envi-
ronmental problems in China. 
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Introduction 
Master plans, also called general plans or comprehensive plans, are 
important documents for the future vision of local jurisdictions (Levy 
2003). Environmental concerns typically refer to the awareness of en-
vironmental problems and prioritizing policies and actions to tackle 
these problems. Generally, master plans that address more environ-
mental concerns may improve local collective action in regard to eco-
system protection, climate change, and smart growth (Berke et al. 
2013; Norton 2008). The extent of environmental concerns in mas-
ter plans varies from place to place depending on the degree to which 
the state mandates attention to environmental issues, as well as the 
role played by local education level, political will, officials, and plan-
ners in the development of the master plans (Brody, Highfield, and 
Carrasco 2004; Norton 2008). 
Though these factors influencing master plans in North America 
and Australia are well discussed in the planning literature (Berke and 
Godschalk 2009; Stevens 2013; Tang and Brody 2009; Tang et al. 
2011), little research has been conducted in China, where the master 
planning process is different in terms of nationwide statutory require-
ments, powerful local leaders, party-state regime, and a planning cul-
ture dominated by modernization and physical planning (Abramson 
2006; Leaf 2005; Tian and Shen 2011; Zhang 2002). In particular, the 
effects of local leaders’ attributes on environmental concerns in mas-
ter plans are not well explored, although some studies have found that 
local leaders have a prominent role in China’s local public affairs (Li 
and Zhou 2005; Zhang 2002). 
In this article, we report the findings of a study that evaluates envi-
ronmental concerns in 80 municipal master plans (MMPs) from China, 
and explores the impacts of local leaders. The research can contrib-
ute to a body of knowledge on plan evaluation with the master plans 
from China, a region not well covered by the existing plan evaluation 
research. Second, the word count method we use is especially appro-
priate in a context in which a hierarchical administration and plan-
ning system dominates the planning process. Third, we explain factors 
influencing environmental concerns in Chinese master plans, in par-
ticular, the factors from local leaders, which can give a distinctive ex-
planation as to why some MMPs show more environmental concerns 
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than the others. In doing so, we address two research questions: (1) To 
what extent are environmental concerns expressed in China’s MMPs? 
(2) What kinds of influence do local leaders impose on the level of en-
vironmental concerns expressed in the MMPs? 
We begin by drawing on the literature to establish a theoretical 
framework to explain the presence of environmental concerns in mas-
ter plans and the influence of local leaders’ personal characteristics 
on those concerns. Then we describe the methods used to collect and 
analyze the plan quality and their influential variables. Next we pres-
ent our findings and discuss the implications of the findings for pro-
moting environmental concerns. 
Literature Review 
Environmental Concerns in MMPs from China 
Environmental concerns generally refer to “the degree to which peo-
ple are aware of problems regarding the environment and support ef-
forts to solve them and/or indicate a willingness to contribute per-
sonally to their solution” (Dunlap and Jones 2002). Master plans are 
important documents for thinking about a city in an integrated way 
(Levy 2003). Therefore, it can reflect the environmental concerns of 
cities— the extent to which these cities express their awareness of 
environmental problems and their priority in policies and actions to 
tackle these problems. They are especially important in that the scope 
of master plans has expanded from land use to addressing social is-
sues, economic needs, and environmental crises (Kaiser and Godschalk 
1995). As Berke et al. (2013) recommended, it is time to incorporate 
environmental thinking into comprehensive plans, but the approach 
must consider different planning regimes. 
Most existing frameworks of plan evaluation, covering broad issues 
like environmental protection, affordable housing, climate change ac-
tions, hazard mitigation, community plans, ecosystem protection, and 
smart growth, are conducted from plans in the United States, Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and Canada (Baker, Sipe, and Gleeson 2006; Berke, 
Song, and Stevens 2009; Berke et al. 2013; Berke and Godschalk 2009; 
Brody, Highfield, and Carrasco 2004; Lyles and Stevens 2014; Tang et 
al. 2011). Plans from these countries, based on the principle of repre-
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sentative democracy, are engaged with elected officials and the gen-
eral public. Therefore, comprehensive plans in these local contexts can 
express openly and freely the future viewpoint and trade-off between 
economic development and environmental protection (Norton 2005; 
Loh and Norton 2015). Master plans in China, however, are still dom-
inated by a hierarchical system and party-state regime, despite the 
growing effects from the market and the local public. Under the in-
stitutional context, the central government sets down general goals of 
economic development, social equality, and environmental protection, 
and local governments cannot openly express disagreement on these 
goals in their master plans, but can make implicit choices by empha-
sizing some goals and neglecting others. 
The standard procedures of municipal master planning in China in-
clude four steps. First, once the locality has the proper permits in hand 
stating its intention to do master planning, the municipal government 
can offer the master planning work to a certified planning institute 
through a contract or a consultancy agreement. Second, the commis-
sioned planning institute will survey, collect data, and interview cad-
res from different departments and other stakeholders from the pub-
lic. During the survey process, the municipal mayor organizes the 
procedure and the municipal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secre-
tary will attend important discussions and express his or her opinion 
for the future image of the city to the planners. The institute will fin-
ish several preliminary drafts of the master plan based on “scientific” 
data analysis, discussions with local cadres, and opinions of munici-
pal leaders, while also incorporating national laws, ordinances, and 
statutory technical guidance. Then planners can display the positive 
and negative responses to preliminary drafts to local leaders, planning 
staff, and cadres from other departments. Based on the feedback they 
receive, planners will then form one single draft of the master plan. In 
the process of communication and plan adjustment, local leaders play 
a dominant role in directing the strategy of the final draft. Some plan-
ners even complain that during master planning “it is the local leader 
doing the planning and planners doing some drawing” (Zhang 2002). 
The third step is public involvement, hearings, and consultation. 
The final draft must be open to the general public for their suggestions 
and opinions. Meanwhile, the municipal government will also consult 
experts and conduct public hearings. The planners can then adjust the 
master plan according to the suggestions of the experts and the pub-
Zhang et  al .  in  J.  of  Planning  Educ .  &  Res .  38  (2018)        5
lic. However, the effects of public involvement vary widely across cit-
ies because local governments can choose both the form that public 
involvement takes and the extent to which the opinions of the public 
and experts are accepted or rejected. 
Later the revised version of the MMP of a large municipality (with 
urban population more than one million) is submitted to the State 
Council for approval.1 An expert committee led by the Ministry of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MHURD), the national de-
partment in charge of urban planning, and joined by fourteen other 
related ministries (e.g., the Committee of Social-economic Reform 
and Ministry of Environmental Protection) checks whether the MMP 
complies with the state’s mandated planning goals according to laws, 
ordinances, policies, and statutory guidance and standards. The ap-
proved MMP will then become a statutory plan, regulating urban de-
velopment for a specified term of ten to twenty years. A final MMP 
is in fact a negotiated result between the state and local govern-
ment and reflects preferences of local governments balancing mul-
tiple objectives of economic development, environmental protection, 
and social stability. 
Evaluating Environmental Concerns by Word Counting 
MMPs in China reflect local preference in a different way than west-
ern plans; it is necessary to rethink a plan evaluation method suit-
able to the distinctive context. Until now, the most common approach 
to plan evaluation content analysis is by item coding with an estab-
lished framework of good plans (Berke and Godschalk 2009; Berke 
et al. 2013; Brody 2003; Brody, Highfield, and Carrasco 2004; God-
schalk et al. 1999; Stevens 2013; Tang and Brody 2009). The plan eval-
uation process of item coding generally includes developing a concep-
tual framework, constructing a protocol of items, coding items by a 
single or multiple trained coders, and checking the reliability and va-
lidity of results (Berke and Godschalk 2009; Lyles and Stevens 2014; 
Stevens 2013). Though the item coding approach holds a potential in 
evaluating plans beyond North America and Europe, Counting Word 
Frequency (CWF) can be a reliable approach, with three advantages 
to measure the environmental concerns of MMPs in China. 
First, the CWF method, based on a naïve Bayes assumption in con-
tent analysis that “a text is represented as vector of word counts or 
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occurrence” (Slapin and Proksch 2008), has been commonly used in 
content analysis in political science, public management, and, to a 
less extent, of urban planning (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Klüver 
2013; Quinn et al. 2010). Though having poor performance in flexibil-
ity and complexity, CWF approach, with the help of computer aided 
program, can reduce the likelihood of human error and personal bias 
associated with code noting (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Moreover, 
in case of using CWF for English text, it is necessary to simplify the 
vocabulary with stemming, which reduces the complexity by mapping 
words that refer to the same basic concept to a single root. In Chinese, 
however, there are no separate singular and plural forms for nouns, 
no verb conjugation to denote sense or match with the corresponding 
subject. For example, family, families, and familial all use the same 
word of jiating (family) in Chinese. Therefore, the stemming work for 
Chinese texts can be much easier than that for English texts. 
Second, MMPs in China reflect local preference in an implicit ap-
proach. As previously mentioned, the central government sets down 
general goals of economic development, social equality, and environ-
mental protection; local governments cannot openly express their dis-
agreement on these goals but can make a choice among them, em-
phasizing some goals and neglecting others. As for the words and 
expression on environmental concerns, few plans use these environ-
ment- related words with negative expression, such as “a municipal-
ity should neglect the environment, environmental protection, and 
climate change.” For instance, a municipality prioritizing economic 
growth even at the expense of the environmental degradation will not 
express its idea in plans with a phrase such as “strengthen the eco-
nomic growth and disregard environmental protection” but replace it 
with “strengthen the economic growth” and mention no ideas on en-
vironmental protection. Thus, the frequency of words in a certain do-
main can reveal the extent to which a municipality prioritizes the is-
sue. The approach of measuring the level of policy priority through 
the number or relative proportion of documents or terms on differ-
ent issues is commonly used in studies of environmental issues in an 
authoritarian political setting (Huang et al. 2010). The reluctance to 
use a negative expression on environment-related words partly re-
lieve the problem of the different meaning a word might have within 
another text in MMPs. 
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Third, China’s MMPs are very standardized in their structure of 
drafts, and similar in language style. MHURD issues a series of guide-
lines and requirements for drafting urban and rural plans. These 
guidelines regulate the structures and styles that the text of master 
plans in China should obey. Moreover, planners making MMPs in China 
are required to pass the Chinese Registered Planner (CRR) certifica-
tion exam, the only nationwide, official verification of planners’ qual-
ifications in China. Once passed, they also need to complete several 
training courses required in each year for CRR certification mainte-
nance. The China Association of City Planning led by the MHURD is in 
charge of both the CRR exam and the subsequent training programs, 
assuring that all registered planners are familiar with the guidelines 
and requirements for drafting master plans. 
Both the standardized form and the reluctance to use negative ex-
pression can make CWF a suitable method to measure the environmen-
tal concerns in China’s MMPs. But it should also be mentioned that all 
languages are complex. There is no exception for Chinese language. 
The CWF method will not eliminate the need for careful thought by re-
searchers nor remove the necessity of reading texts. Therefore, it is also 
necessary to supplement the CWF method with careful human reading, 
and confirm their results with the common approach of item coding. 
Local Leaders’ Effects on Environmental Concerns in China 
Early plan evaluation research discussed methods to evaluate the dif-
ferences in the quality of plans, but more recent studies focus on fac-
tors that explain these differences. They broadly include planning con-
texts (e.g., population, wealth, education; Berke 1996; Brody, Carrasco, 
and Highfield 2006; Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003; Stevens 2013; 
Tang et al. 2010), local jurisdictions (e.g., local political supports, the 
values and preferences of decision makers, statutory obligations, and 
interplay with higher levels of governance; Berke 1996; Betsill 2001; 
Burby and Dalton 1994; Burby and May 1998; Tang et al. 2010; Urwin 
and Jordan 2008), planning agencies and planners (Burby and May 
1998; Loh and Norton 2015; Tang and Brody 2009), and public par-
ticipation (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003). 
Among these four explanations, planning scholars have consistently 
stressed the dominant role of decision makers on the policy focus of 
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local plans (Betsill 2001; Burby and May 1998; Tang et al. 2010). The 
difference in their awareness of, commitment to deal with, and ca-
pacity to solve issues may lead to differences in the policy focus of 
local plans (Burby and May 1998; Norton 2005; Tang et al. 2010). 
However, many of these debates on the role of decision makers (e.g., 
mayors) on local plans are based on a North American or European 
context, where local regimes are based on representative democracy. 
Although the policy focus may not entirely reflect the preference of 
the general public, the policy preference in a local representative gov-
ernment should align with the public preference as closely as possi-
ble (Loh and Norton 2015). 
Local governments in China differ from those of North America 
and Europe in their accountability and commitment. Effects of local 
leaders in China are also distinctive from their counterparts in North 
America or Europe. The state exerts more influence on public affairs, 
and local officers are more accountable to the Central Government 
than to the local public (Abramson 2006; Zhang 2002). 
Leaders in China’s municipalities answer to both the CCP secre-
tary and the mayor, which reflects the dual presence of the commu-
nist party and administrative government (Li and Zhou 2005; Zheng 
et al. 2014). Despite being equal in rank within the hierarchy party-
state regime, CCP city secretaries have somewhat more authority than 
the mayor according to laws that regulate the government under the 
leadership of the CCP. In practice, CCP secretaries are mainly in charge 
of personnel and political affairs, and mayors are responsible for the 
administration of economic development, environmental protection, 
education, and so on. Neither municipal CCP secretaries nor mayors 
are directly elected by residents of the jurisdiction. Rather, they are 
selected by those serving in higher tiers of government. 
China’s municipal leaders are powerful and strongly influence local 
public affairs (Eaton and Kostka 2014; Wu et al. 2013). Since the eco-
nomic reform in 1978 and the tax sharing reform in 1994, the Central 
Government has decentralized most decision making and given par-
tial budgetary control to local governments (Li and Zhou 2005; Tsui 
and Wang 2004). Moreover, local governments may also acquire ex-
trabudgetary revenues through their monopolistic power over the land 
market (Tao 2010). Municipal leaders wield significant authority and 
influence over almost all major decisions in a municipality, especially 
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those involving the appointment of sublevel officials and economic 
problems (Eaton and Kostka 2014). 
However, these powerful municipal leaders do not operate without 
constraints. As agents of the state, municipal leaders are evaluated by 
metrics and held directly accountable to higher levels of government 
(Li and Zhou 2005). Since the economic reforms in 1978, the central 
government has adjusted these metrics from political ideology and 
loyalty to the ability to promote economic growth (Bo 1996). The ef-
fects of these changes have been shown in the literature, confirming 
the positive connection between economic growth and official promo-
tion in provincial, municipal, and township levels (Edin 2003; Martis 
et al. 2000; Li and Zhou 2005). Most recently, facing severe problems 
of environmental degradation along with economic growth, the Cen-
tral Government has increasingly focused on environmental issues in 
evaluating local leaders (Wu 2009; Ran 2013). The transition, some-
times defined as “authoritarian environmentalism,” is top–down and 
rooted in the statutory power of the central state (Gilley 2012) and dif-
fers from democratic environmentalism in Western countries, which 
relies more on public concerns, elections, and mobilization (List and 
Sturm 2006). 
However, the environment-oriented transition of the Central Gov-
ernment has not generally aligned with practical outcomes in localities 
(Gilley 2012; Yu, Pagani, and Huang 2012). Little research has found 
a positive connection between environmental protection and official 
promotion (Ran 2013). On the contrary, Wu (2013) found that more 
spending on environmental amenities negatively affects the promo-
tion of prefectural-level city leaders in China. Ran (2013) attributes 
the failure to the Central Government, which provides little political, 
financial, and moral incentive to encourage local leaders to focus on 
the long-term (e.g., environmental protection and sustainably) instead 
of tangible and short-term outcomes (e.g., economic growth). How-
ever, Economy (2004) and Lo and Tang (2006) blamed local govern-
ments as the key obstacle in including environmental concerns, be-
cause of their popular pro-growth values and weak control from the 
Central Government. 
Further research shows that local leaders’ performance levels vary 
with key attributes, including their duration, education, age, and 
working experience (Eaton and Kostka 2014; Lorentzen, Landry, and 
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Yasuda 2010). Among them, Eaton and Kostka (2014) found that short 
duration generates significant negative effects on environmental pol-
icy implementation. Lorentzen (2010) showed that local leaders’ edu-
cation, such as training abroad and training in law, can promote more 
expedited implementation of environmental amenities and higher lev-
els of environmental transparency. However, little research has ex-
plored the effects of local leaders’ attributes on environmental con-
cerns in master plans. 
Methods and Data 
The first step in carrying out our study was accessing the MMPs. Given 
the fact that full versions of MMPs in most of China’s large municipal-
ities are inaccessible to the public, we collected MMPs adopted from 
2000 to 2012 by direct requests to planning authorities or planning 
institutes participating in master planning, by emails and phone calls. 
Some of them refused to provide their plans, resulting in us collecting 
80 MMPs, which accounted for 76.2 percent of the total 105 MMPs for 
China’s large municipalities during this period. They covered all thirty-
one provincial-level administrations in mainland China. 
Then we measured the environmental concerns by CWF method, 
comparing the probability of environmentally related words within 
each master plan draft. We counted the occurrence of environmen-
tal-related words in master plans in three steps. First, we briefly read 
all texts of master plans. Then we listed the frequency of all Chi-
nese words in texts using Rost CM 6.0 (a software for Chinese con-
tent analysis), and excluded all conjunctions, adverbs, and adjectives 
(Chinese does not have articles), as well as all words in maps, fig-
ures, and charts. The most common word used in the eighty master 
plans is development (fazhan), with the frequency of 8.28 per thou-
sand, and the frequency of the hundredth common word is 0.26 per 
thousand. The average frequency of the most common one hundred 
words is 1.57 per thousand, in contrast to 0.03 per thousand of the 
succeeding one hundred most common words. So we just chose the 
words related to environment from the one hundred most common 
words, and come up with seven words, including environment (huan-
jing), environmental protection (huanbao), sustainable (kechixu), eco-
logical (shengtai), carbon emission (tanpaifang), and climate change 
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(qihoubianhua). The frequency of these seven common environmen-
tal-related words were summed in each plan as the variable reflect-
ing the environmental concerns. 
To confirm the reliability of the CWF method, we also employed 
a correlation analysis between the result of environmental concerns 
from word counting and that of the common approach of item noting 
in plan quality research. The protocol for item noting takes in part 
upon the common seven dimensions of plan quality developed by God-
schalk et al. (1999), as well as the framework of direction and action 
recently developed by Berke et al. (2013). Since this study focuses on 
the environmental concerns as a whole, rather than individual dimen-
sions of plan quality, we regard the fact base as awareness for environ-
mental issues and combine dimensions of goal, policies, implementa-
tion, and monitoring and coordination as one reflecting the willingness 
and supports to improve environment. Each item of the protocol was 
established by the authors and two research assistants with consen-
sus on score assignments after coding five master plans other than 
those under study. Each item was scored on a 0 or 1. 1 means that the 
indicator was included, and 0 means not. The protocol originally con-
tained sixty items. After coding all eighty master plans under study, 
six items were excluded because their intercoder reliability was less 
than 80 percent, a standard that most existing plan quality studies 
meet (Berke and Godschalk 2009). 
Because master plans differ in both their length and number of 
environmentally related words, we employed a logistic model for 
grouped data to analyze the possible effects on environmental con-
cerns using Stata 12.0. Each draft of the master plan is regarded as a 
group, within which each word is defined as environmentally related 
(coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Then the effects on the probability 
of environmentally related words occurring could be explored by the 
logit model, which produces maximum-likelihood logit estimates on 
grouped data (Hamilton 2013; Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 
2013; Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt 2004). 
We analyzed these variables on environmental concerns in two 
stages. First, variables of local leaders’ attributes, planning consul-
tants and public participation, were separately examined with logit 
regression. Then in the second stage, we combined all three groups 
of variables into one model and confirmed variables being statisti-
cally significant. 
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Attributes of Local Leaders 
As we discussed above, both the mayor and CCP secretary have pre-
dominant effects in the process of master planning. Their effects on 
environmental concerns in finalized master plans possibly differ ac-
cording to their age, education, and working experience, as has been 
identified in studies of environmental policy implementation and en-
vironmental transparency (Eaton and Kostka 2014; Lorentzen 2010). 
Therefore, we chose age, education level, major and working expe-
rience of both CCP city secretary and mayor as variables possibly af-
fecting environmental concerns in a master plan (as Table 1 shows). 
We first divided local leaders into three age groups of young (for-
ties), middle (fifties), and aged (sixties) based on their age when plans 
are made, because fifty and sixty are important age points for higher-
level governments to promote local leaders. Second, education level of 
local leaders was classified into three levels: high level refers to these 
officers with a full-time master’s degree or a bachelor’s degree from 
China’s top thirty-nine universities.2 Middle level refers to those with a 
full-time bachelor’s degree from a university other than the top thirty-
nine universities. Low are those without a full-time bachelor’s degree. 
We posit that the education level of local leaders may have a positive 
effect on environmental concerns. Another variable reflecting educa-
tion of local leaders is whether or not their major is related to the en-
vironment. Training in environmentally related fields provides local 
leaders more professional skills and knowledge, which could possi-
bly promote environmental concerns in master plans. The last vari-
able on the personal characteristics of local leaders is whether or not 
their working experience is related to the environment. It is possi-
ble that an officer with environmentally related working experience 
would be more concerned about environmental issues. The personal 
information of city leaders was collected from the website of Baidu 
Baike, which provides both the curriculum vitae of local leaders who 
have been appointed since the late 1990s and their links with the of-
ficial website of city governments.3  
City Context 
The variables of city context control for the possible impacts of the 
general socioeconomic background on local environmental concerns 
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Table 1. Variable Definition and Summary Statistics.
Variable  Definition and Data Source  Mean  Standard
   Deviation
Dependent variable: environmental concerns
   Words for environment  The number of words related on environmenta  245.83  105.31
   Words in plans  Total number of words in each master plana  4,8811.06  1,5187.85
City context
   Regions located  Region locatedb
      Eastern  Cities in the eastern region (1=yes, 0=no)  0.46  0.502
      Central  Cities in the central region (1=yes, 0=no)  0.20  0.403
      Western  Cities in the western region (1=yes, 0=no)  0.20  0.403
      Northeastern  Cities in the northeastern region (1=yes, 0=no)  0.14  0.347
   Political status  Administration level (1=provincial, vice-provincial cities, and  0.425  0.497 
    provincial capital, 0=prefectural level)b
   Wealth  GDP per capita (unit: CNY)b  26,462  15,644
   Education  Rank of the percentage of high education (from 1 to 80)  40.50  23.24
   Industrial structure  The share of secondary industryb  47.77  10.780
   Time  Plans issued after 2007 (yes=1, no=0)a  0.72  0.454
Planning consultant  National planning institute=1, local institute=0a  0.44  0.499
Public participation
   Plan exhibition  With a plans exhibition hall (yes=1, no=0)c  0.42  0.497
   Reply public online  Reply to public suggestions and communication on master  0.62  0.488 
    plans online (yes=1, no=0)c
Leader’s attributes
   Age_M  Age group mayor belongs tod
      60s  Mayors aged 60-69 (yes=1, no=0)  0.13  0.336
      50s  Mayors aged 50-59 (yes=1, no=0)  0.54  0.502
      40s  Mayors aged 40-49 (yes=1, no=0)  0.33  0.474
   Age_S  Age group CCP secretary belongs tod
      60s  CCP secretary aged 60-69 (yes=1, no=0)  0.13  0.336
      50s  CCP secretary aged 50-59 (yes=1, no=0)  0.68  0.470
      40s  CCP secretary aged 40-49 (yes=1, no=0)  0.18  0.386
   Education_M  The education level of the mayord
      High  With a master’s degree or bachelor’s degree from one of  0.39  0.493 
    the top 39 universities (yes=1, no=0)
      Middle  With bachelor’s degree from non-top universities (yes=1, no=0)  0.40  0.493
      Low  Without a bachelor’s degree (yes=1, no=0) 0.20 0.406
   Education_S  The education level of the CCP secretaryd
      High  With master’s degree or bachelor’s degree from a top university 0.45  0.500 
    (yes=1, no=0)
      Middle  With a bachelor’s degree from a non-top university (yes=1, no=0) 0.45  0.500
      Low  Without a bachelor’s degree (yes=1, no=0)  0.11  0.309
   Major_ M  Mayor with degree related to environment (1=yes, 0=no)d  0.385  0.490
   Major_S  CCP secretaries with degree related to environment (1=yes, 0=no)d  0.45  0.500
   Work Experience_M  Mayor with environmental working experience (1=yes, 0=no)d  0.167  0.375
   Work Experience_S  CCP secretaries with environmental working experience (1=yes, 0=no)d  0.05  0.222
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; CNY = Chinese yuan; CCP = Chinese Communist Party.
a. Data based on the content analysis of master plans by research team.
b. Data from the China City Statistical Yearbook from 2001 to 2013.
c. Data collected from websites of planning authorities of 80 large municipalities under the study in 2014.
d. Data collected from the website of Baidu Baike http://baike.baidu.com and websites of city governments of 80 large 
municipalities under the study in 2014.
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in master plans. In this study, city context variables are wealth, edu-
cation, scales, industrial structure, and the time being adopted. All city 
context data, except for the time, are collected from the China City 
Statistical Yearbook from 2001 to 2013, which, issued by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China every year, is an 
authoritative data source to acquire information on the population, 
economy, and education of all Chinese cities. 
The wealth of a city possibly contributes to the environmental con-
cerns in plans because with increased income, the general public con-
cerns itself more with environmental issues (Scott and Willits 1994; 
Selden and Song 1995). In addition, wealthier cities have more finan-
cial, human, and technical resources, which could also contribute to 
high-quality plans reflecting more environmental concerns (Tang et al. 
2010). Finally, wealthy cities in China face less pressure on economic 
growth in the race for GDP, and, as a result, can possibly lead to a rela-
tively high environmental priority in their master plans. Therefore, we 
measure the wealth of the eighty municipalities according to their per-
capita GDP value in the year when their plans were finished. The per-
capita GDP values in different years are all converted to that of 2000. 
In addition to the wealth, municipalities with industrial structure 
highly dependent on secondary industry can also lead to more atten-
tion on environmental concerns in their master plans. The reason is 
that these municipalities confront more pollution due to the heavy 
weight of the secondary industry (Shen 2006), and the national trans-
fer to environmental priority promoted by the central government 
forces cities with serious environmental degradation to be more re-
sponsible for environmental degradation, no matter if they prefer or 
not (Gilley 2012; Ran 2013). We measure the industrial structure by 
the GDP share of the secondary industry. 
Education is the third city context variable that can influence en-
vironmental concerns in master plans. A highly educated population 
may influence the planning process and encourage an increased inter-
est in environmental concerns (Brody, Highfield, and Carrasco 2004; 
Howell and Laska 1992; Tang et al. 2011). We measure the education 
level by ranking incidence of highly educated people of the total pop-
ulation of the city in the year the plan was made. 
Large municipalities in different regions may differ in policy and 
cultural contexts. China divides all provinces into four regions. Cit-
ies in the Eastern region are economically well developed; the Cen-
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tral Region is considered a rapid growth area; the Western Region re-
ceives more financial support from the Central Government and the 
Northeastern Region is more strongly influenced by the prior com-
mand economy. 
China’s large municipalities also differ in population size (ranging 
from one million to more than ten million) and administrative level 
(the highest is provincial level city and the lowest is prefecture level 
city) (Abramson 2006). Largescale cities or communities can poten-
tially raise more concern about environmental issues in plans (Tang 
and Brody 2009). High administrative level means the municipal lead-
ers should comply more with the Central Government’s environmen-
tal concerns. In China, these two variables are closely intertwined, 
with a larger urban population in most cases acquiring a higher ad-
ministrative level. So we combine both size of urban population and 
political position into a variable of scale, and code provincial-level 
city, sub provincial-level, and provincial capital municipalities as 1, 
and all others as 0. 
Environmental concerns in MMPs may also differ because of the 
time of adoption. National efforts to tackle environmental problems 
have been increasing over the last two decades, particularly after 
2007, when a cabinet-level environmental ministry was established 
and environmental targets were adopted in the National 12th Five Year 
Plan. As well, the law of Urban and Rural Planning, requiring more 
sustainable development, was issued. We divided the MMPs into those 
being issued after 2007 (code 1) or not (code 0) to check the possible 
effects of increased environmental concerns from the state mandates. 
Planning Consultants and Public Participation 
We also have control variables for planning institutes and public 
participation. There are three types of planning institutes in China 
(Abramson 2006): local planning institutes subordinated to provin-
cial and municipal governments, the national planning institute sub-
ordinated to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, 
and planning institutes at departments of universities. Because none 
of our sample master plans was done by a university planning depart-
ment, we divided the planning institutes as either national (coded as 
1) or local (coded as 0). In general, the national planning institute has 
a more highly esteemed professional reputation and better developed 
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social networks with the Central Government, while local planning in-
stitutes take advantage of local knowledge and social networks with 
local governments. 
The role of public participation has been thoroughly discussed in 
European and North American planning circles (Brody, Godschalk, 
and Burby 2003; Berke et al. 2013; Tang et al. 2010), but it is a new 
topic for China’s urban planning. Most cities began to incorporate pub-
lic participation during the process of master planning by posting a 
draft of the master plan either onsite or online for public suggestions 
or recommendations. However, great differences still exist in prac-
tice. Some city governments exhibit draft master plans for a long time 
at sites that are popularly known and easily accessed by the general 
public, while others do not. Similarly, some planning staff members 
in municipalities actively reply to popular opinions online, whereas 
those in other municipalities do not. Therefore, we take two variables 
to measure public participation in master planning. One is whether or 
not the city has an accessible and fixed place to exhibit the draft plans 
(coded as 1), or not (coded as 0). Another is whether planning staff 
reply to general suggestions (coded as 1), or not (coded as 0) about 
master plans on their official website. The information for these two 
variables was collected online via the official websites of municipal 
urban planning bureaus, planning exhibition halls, etc. 
Results and Discussion 
The results confirm that there are great differences in the degree of 
environmental concern in master plans, in the degree to which large 
municipalities in China express their awareness on environmental 
problems and in priority on policies and actions to curb environmen-
tal problems. Table 1 shows that the mean frequencies of environmen-
tal words in master plans is 245.3 words, with a standard deviation 
of 105.31. In addition, the mean length of master plans is 48,811.06 
words, with a standard deviation of 15,187.85. 
In a different way, item noting based on established protocol also 
confirms the difference of the eighty master plans under study in en-
vironmental concerns. As Table 2 shows, the mean score from the 
protocol of environmental concerns was 34.85, with a standard devi-
ation of 4.44. 
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Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient between the score 
when environmental concerns are evaluated by item noting and the 
frequency from environmental word counting. The correlation is pos-
itive and strong, with a value of 0.883, as well as being statistically 
significant. Moreover, we also separately analyze the correlations be-
tween the frequency of environmentally related words and score of 
awareness, and that of willingness and supports by item coding. Both 
the awareness and willingness and supports are important aspects of 
environmental concern. Awareness, referring to the extent to which 
a municipality is aware of environmental problems, is measured by 
score of fact base by item coding within MMPs. The willingness and 
supports to improve the environment is measured by the score of goal, 
policies, implementation, and monitoring and coordination in MMPs. 
Both of the two correlations are positive, with values of 0.633 and 
0.718. All results from the correlation analysis confirm the credibility 
of the method that using word frequency counting evaluates environ-
mental concerns in China’s MMPs. 
Using the probability of environmentally related words, Table 4 
reports the maximum likelihood estimates resulting from four logit 
models. Models 1 to 3 separately explore effects from variables of lo-
cal leaders’ attributes, city context, planning consultants, and public 
participation. Model 4 then combines all three groups of variables. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Environmental Concerns Score from Code Noting.
Variable  Number  Mean  Minimum  Maximum Standard 
 of Items      Deviation
Environmental concerns  54  34.85  26  44  4.44
Awareness  16  5.14  0  13  3.06
Willingness and supports  38  29.73  24  35  2.79
Table 3. The Correlations Analysis between the Score from Code Noting and Frequency of 
Word Counting.
Variable   Frequency of Environmentally Related Words
Scores of environmental concerns  0.883***
Scores of awareness  0.633***
Scores of willingness and supports  0.718***
* p < 0.1 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.05
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Table 4. Logistic Regression on Environmental Issues.
  Model 1        Model 2        Model 3          Model 4
Variable  Coeff.  z  Coeff.  z  Coeff.  z  Coeff.  z
Local leader’s attributes
   Age_Mayor (reference = 60s)
      50s  −0.115***  −0.025      −0.030  −1.00
      40s  −0.059**  −0.026      –0.039**  −2.03
   Age_Secretary (reference = 60s)
      50s  −0.083***  −0.024      –0.110***  −1.86
      40s  −0.120***  −0.028      –0.242***  −8.57
   Education_M (reference = low)
      Middle  −0.038**  −0.018      0.053***  2.24
      High  0.100***  −0.020      0.075***  3.78
   Education_S (reference = low)
      Middle  −0.014  −0.016      −0.009  −0.46
      High  0.039  −0.029      0.137***  4.18
   Major_M  0.148***  −0.018      0.151***  7.92
   Major_S  0.075***  −0.017      0.056***  3.17
   Work Experience_M  −0.036*  −0.021      −0.017  −0.72
   Work Experiences_S  0.089***  −0.032      0.062  1.41
City context
   Scale    0.188***  7.27    0.183***  6.21
   Region (reference = cities in the eastern region)
      Middle    −0.117***  −5.26    −0.029  −1.04
      Western    0.052**  2.09    −0.022  −0.74
      Northeastern    0.056**  2.04    0.085***  2.64
   Industrial structure    0.003***  3.52    0.002**  2.17
   GDP rank    2.21e–06**  2.03    5.58e–06***  4.48
   Education level    −0.002***  −2.83    –0.004**  −3.94
   Time    −0.020  −1.12    0.017  0.89
Planning institute and public participation
   Planning institute      −0.056***  −0.373  –0.035**  −2.12
   Planning exhibition     0.058***  3.94  0.053***  2.91
   Reply public online      0.057***  3.74  0.049***  2.44
_cons  −5.224***  − 0.029  −5.653***  −66.31  −5.308***  −0.020  –5.937***  −53.50
Prob > chi2  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
Note: Coeff. = coefficient; GDP = gross domestic product.
* p < 0.10 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01
Zhang et  al .  in  J.  of  Planning  Educ .  &  Res .  38  (2018)        19
Local Leaders’ Attributes 
The results of models 1 and 4 indicate that the attributes of local 
leaders are closely associated with environmental concerns in MMPs. 
Among them, age, personal education level, and major are statistically 
significant, while work experience related to the environment is not. 
First, the results indicate that the age of local leaders, both may-
ors and CCP secretaries, connects positively to environmental con-
cerns in MMPs. MMPs of large municipalities with local leaders aged 
sixty years or older have, in general, more environmental words than 
those with local leaders aged less than sixty years, and hence MMPs 
with local leaders aged fifty to fifty-nine years more than those with 
local leaders aged less than fifty years. The results correlate with the 
argument (e.g., Li and Zhou 2005; Zheng et al. 2014) that that since 
China’s cadre personnel system prefers to promote young leaders, the 
aged CCP secretaries and mayors who have lost their chance for pro-
motion can afford to be more concerned about long-term municipal 
environmental issues rather than short-term economic growth. 
The education of local leaders also positively correlates with envi-
ronmental concerns. Both the mayors and CCP secretaries with envi-
ronmentally related majors correlate positively with the degree of en-
vironmental concerns. Moreover, the education level of mayors shows 
more significant positive effects than that of CCP secretaries. Models 1 
and 4 indicate at a statistically significant level (p < 0.01) that highly 
educated mayors show a greater concern about environmental issues 
than mayors with a middle or low level of education. However, the ef-
fects of CCP secretaries’ education level are not so confirmed, giving 
the result that the dummy variable of both highly educated and mid-
dle educated are not statistically significant in the separated model 
1, and only the variable of the highly educated are statistically signif-
icant in combined model 4 (p < 0.01). Even so, we can say that Chi-
na’s large municipalities with local leaders having higher and more 
environmentally related education can positively affect environmen-
tal concerns in their MMPs. 
Finally, the working experience of local leaders related to the envi-
ronment contributes little to environmental concerns, as in the pop-
ular Chinese saying “The position of officers directs their thinking.” 
Some local leaders may have working experience of the environment, 
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but that does not strengthen their value toward the environment. 
When they are promoted to be a mayor or CCP secretary, no differ-
ence exists between them and those without environmentally related 
working experience. 
City Context 
Our study also identified several contextual factors influencing envi-
ronmental concerns in master plans. First, the wealth of a city con-
tributes to more environmental concerns in its master plan. The result 
comes from the fact that the wealth rank of a city has a negative effect 
on the degree of environmental concerns of master plans in both sep-
arate model 2 (p < 0.05) and combined model 4 (p < 0.01). The posi-
tive effect of wealthy cities to plans is as similar to that of plans from 
the United States, Canada, and Australia. Another parallel result is in 
the argument that education makes a difference in terms of environ-
mental concerns in master plans. In China, the high education level 
of urban residents also promotes more concern about environmental 
issues, which is reflected in the master plans as well. 
In addition, cities with higher shares of secondary industry also 
have positive effects on environmental concerns. It is understandable 
that cities with high shares of secondary industry face more challenges 
in reducing environmental problems, as well as increasing pressure 
from the Central Government, which has begun to prioritize national 
environmental goals. Even if implementation is difficult, the fact that 
the master plans have an environmental focus reflects their aware-
ness of, and willingness to consider, potential action to address the 
problem. 
Finally, environmental concerns also differ slightly among regions. 
Table 2 shows that there is a high probability of environmental words 
in the master plans of cities in the Northeastern Regions, compared 
with those from the other three regions. It is interesting to note that 
cities in the Central Region, where the economy has grown fast and 
environmental degradation has become more serious during the last 
decade, do not include as many environmental concerns in their mas-
ter plans, while cities in the Northeastern Region, where the urban 
economy has increased slowly or even decayed in some cities, show 
high levels of environmental concern. 
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Planning Consultants and Public Participation 
The results also found that planning institutes have effects on envi-
ronmental concerns. Models 2 and 3 show a statistically negative ef-
fect from the national planning institute (p < 0.01). It is quite strange 
that the national planning institute, with its high professional plan-
ning reputation, induces less environmental concerns than local plan-
ning institutes. One possible explanation is that the national planning 
institute is much more familiar with professional guides, procedures, 
and requirements for approving MMPs, and has a strong social net-
work with the Ministry of Housing and Urban- Rural Development as 
well. These two advantages may make it easier to receive approval 
from the Central Government on an MMP with less environmental 
concerns. Another possible reason is that local planning institutes, fa-
miliar with local knowledge, have more awareness about local envi-
ronmental challenges and express them more in MMPs. 
Public participation also has some positive effects on the environ-
mental policy focus in MMPs. First, the cities with stable plan exhi-
bition places accessible to the general public promote more environ-
mental concerns in MMPs. The result is statistically significant in both 
separate model 3 (p < 0.01) and combined model 4 (p < 0.01). In ad-
dition, the positive effects of the variable on reply public online are 
also statistically significant in both model 3 (p < 0.01) and model 4 (p 
< 0.05). The two results confirm that a municipality in which plan-
ning staff actively reply to the public online or display more informa-
tion on site can increase the extent to which environmental concerns 
are expressed in master plans. 
Conclusion 
This study answers the question of the extent to which environmen-
tal concerns are expressed in China’s MMPs, in the case of eighty large 
municipalities, and the question of what kinds of influence local lead-
ers impose on the level of environmental concerns. The two questions 
are significant in understanding the planning process and accountabil-
ity of local governments in systems that are different from those based 
on representative democracy in Europe and North America. Moreover, 
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we focused on environmental concerns because the environment has 
become an issue of note for both China’s Central Government and 
the general public. To what extent the environmental concerns were 
combined in master plans could extensively reflect the roles of the lo-
cal leaders, Central Government, general public, and planners in the 
planning process and planning outcomes under certain city contexts. 
We evaluated environmental concerns in MMPs with CWF method. 
The result shows that environmental concerns are differently ad-
dressed in MMPs of China’s large municipalities. We also confirmed 
the result by correlation analysis with that of item coding, the com-
mon approach to plan evaluation. The positive and statistically sig-
nificant correlations confirm the potential of the CWF method, being 
used in plan evaluation within the institutional context of the hierar-
chy planning system, party-state regime, and the standardized form 
of master plans. 
We also found that personal characteristics of local leaders, the CCP 
city secretary and the mayor, do affect the level of environmental con-
cerns expressed in master plans based on a logit regression for eighty 
master plans. Among these personal attributes, their education and 
age generally play a positive role in environmental concerns. In addi-
tion, there are no obvious effects from their working experience. The 
reason for the positive effect of age may be partially explained by the 
existing cadre evaluation system, where aged local leaders, with less 
chances for promotion, could pursue more long-term environmental 
concerns instead of the short-term objective like economic growth. 
While higher education and environmentally related majors improve 
local leaders’ environmental values, which become infused into the 
planning process. 
Moreover, we identified positive effects of contextual variables like 
wealth, general education level, and public participation. These re-
sults are similar to that of cities in Europe and North America. While 
it is quite interesting that in some countries based on representative 
democracy, state mandates on the environment have an obvious ef-
fect on environmental concerns (Berke 2009; Berke and French 1994; 
Tang et al. 2011), in China, a country with strict hierarchal adminis-
trative structures, the increasing central mandates on environment 
are not reflected in the MMPs of large municipalities. Explaining this 
deviation is difficult, but it shows that the existing planning system 
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in China is far from the ideal hierarchal structure, and local govern-
ments in reality hold more autonomy in local plans. To improve the 
environmental focus in MMPs, a more collaborative approach should 
replace these top–down and coercive mandates. 
Our study also suggests that improving environmental concerns in 
plans may reflect various strategies under different local regimes. For 
China’s large municipalities, more environmentally related training 
could cause considerable effects on promoting environmental concerns 
in MMPs. Also the existing cadre evaluation system, which prefers 
young officers, should be readjusted to reduce local leaders’ incen-
tives to implement short-term metrics. 
However, our research does not explore the processes by which 
these local leaders exert their personal influence on MMPs through 
planning institutes and planners. Also our study is limited in that we 
did not consider the role of public servants and managers in the plan-
ning bureaus, important agents who connect local leaders, the general 
public, and local knowledge with planning institutes and planners, be-
cause the personal information of the managers and staff members 
of planning bureaus in most large municipalities, unlike these local 
leaders, are inaccessible to the public. Therefore, further studies on 
the master plan making process by case study could deepen our un-
derstanding of how these mayors and CCP secretaries influence mas-
ter plans through communication with planning staff members, plan-
ning institutes and planners, or vice versa. 
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Notes 
1. A municipality with urban population less than one million just needs an approval 
from its provincial government. 
2. Though there are no official or authorized university ranking so far in China, a 
group of thirty-nine universities have good academic and educational reputation, 
and are sponsored with the “project 985” funding (top university funding ) by the 
Ministry of Education of China. 
3. The website of Baidu Baike provides both the curriculum vitae of all precedent 
and current local leaders of large municipalities since 1990s and their links with 
the official website of city governments. We collected data of local leaders be-
tween July and September 2014 in two steps: the first is to enter “the name of 
city” + “mayor (or party secretary)” in Baidu Baike and collect attributes of local 
leaders used in this study, the second is to check the information with those pro-
vided by the official website of city governments. 
References 
Abramson, Daniel Benjamin. 2006. “Urban Planning in China: Continuity and 
Change: What the Future Holds May Surprise You.” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 72 (2): 197–215. 
Baker, Douglas C., Neil G. Sipe, and Brendan J. Gleeson. 2006. “Performance-
Based Planning: Perspectives from the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 25 (4): 396–409. 
Berke, Philip R. 1996. “Enhancing Plan Quality: Evaluating the Role of State 
Planning Mandates for Natural Hazard Mitigation.” Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 39 (1): 79–96. 
Berke, Philip R., and Steven P. French. 1994. “The Influence of State Planning 
Mandates on Local Plan Quality.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 13 
(4): 237–50. 
Berke, Philip, and David Godschalk. 2009. “Searching for the Good Plan: A Meta-
analysis of Plan Quality Studies.” Journal of Planning Literature 23 (3): 227–40. 
Berke, Philip, Yan Song, and M. Stevens. 2009. “Integrating Hazard Mitigation 
into New Urban and Conventional Developments.” Journal of Planning 
Education and Research 28 (4): 441–55. 
Berke, Philip, Danielle Spurlock, George Hess, and Larry Band. 2013. “Local 
Comprehensive Plan Quality and Regional Ecosystem Protection: The Case of 
the Jordan Lake Watershed, North Carolina, U.S.A.” Land Use Policy 31:450–59. 
Betsill, Michele M. 2001. “Mitigating Climate Change in US Cities: Opportunities 
and Obstacles.” Local Environment 6 (4): 393–406. 
Bo, Zhiyue. 1996. “Economic Performance and Political Mobility: Chinese 
Provincial Leaders.” Journal of Contemporary China 5 (12): 135–54. 
Zhang et  al .  in  J.  of  Planning  Educ .  &  Res .  38  (2018)        25
Brody, Samuel D. 2003. “Measuring the Effects of Stakeholder Participation on 
the Quality of Local Plans Based on the Principles of Collaborative Ecosystem 
Management.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 22 (4): 407–19. 
Brody, Samuel D., Virginia Carrasco, and Wesley E. Highfield. 2006. “Measuring 
the Adoption of Local Sprawl: Reduction Planning Policies in Florida.” Journal 
of Planning Education and Research 25 (3): 294–310. 
Brody, Samuel D., David R. Godschalk, and Raymond J. Burby. 2003. “Mandating 
Citizen Participation in Plan Making Six Strategic Choices.” Journal of American 
Planning Association 69 (3): 245–64. 
Brody, Samuel D., Wes Highfield, and Virginia Carrasco. 2004. “Measuring the 
Collective Planning Capabilities of Local Jurisdictions to Manage Ecological 
Systems in Southern Florida.” Landscape and Urban Planning 69 (1): 33–50. 
Burby, Raymond J., and Linda C. Dalton. 1994. “Plans Can Matter! The Role of 
Landing Use Plans and Sate Planning Mandates in Limiting the Development of 
Hazardous Areas Development.” Public Administration Review 54 (3): 229–38. 
Burby, Raymond J., and Peter J. May. 1998. “Intergovernmental Environmental 
Planning: Addressing the Commitment Conundrum.” Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management 41 (1): 95–110. 
Dunlap, Riley E., and Robert E. Jones. 2002. “Environmental Concern: Conceptual 
and Measurement Issues.” In Handbook of Environmental Sociology, edited by 
Riley Dunlap and William Michelson, 482–524. Westport, CT: Greenwood. 
Eaton, Sarah, and Genia Kostka. 2014. “Authoritarian Environmentalism 
Undermined? Local Leaders’ Time Horizons and Environmental Policy 
Implementation in China.” The China Quarterly 218:359–80. 
Economy, Elizabeth C. 2004. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge 
to China’s Future. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
Edin, Maria. 2003. “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre 
Management from a Township Perspective.” China Quarterly 173:35–52. 
Gilley, Bruce. 2012. “Authoritarian Environmentalism and China’s Response to 
Climate Change.” Environmental Politics 21 (2): 287–307. 
Godschalk, David R., Timothy Beatley, Philip R. Berke, David Brower, and 
Edward Kaiser. 1999. Natural Hazard Mitigation: Recasting Disaster Policy and 
Planning. Washington DC: Island Press. 
Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. “Text as Data: The Promise and 
Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts.” Political 
Analysis 21 (3): 267–97. 
Hamilton, Lawrence C. 2013. Statistics with STATA Updated for Version 12. 
Boston, MA: Brooks/Cole. 
Hosmer, David W., Stanley Lemeshow, and Rodney X. Sturdivant. 2013. Applied 
Logistic Regression, 3rd ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Howell, Susan. E., and Shirley. B. Laska. 1992. “The Changing Face of the 
Environmental Coalition: A Research Note.” Environment and Behavior 24 (1): 
134–44. 
Zhang et  al .  in  J.  of  Planning  Educ .  &  Res .  38  (2018)       26
Huang, Xibing, Dingtao Zhao, Colin G. Brown, Yanrui Wu, and Scott A. Waldron. 
2010. “Environmental Issues and Policy Priorities in China: A Content Analysis 
of Government Documents.” China: An International Journal 8 (2): 220–46. 
Kaiser, Edward, and David R. Godschalk. 1995. “Twentieth Century Land Use 
Planning: A Stalwart Family Tree.” Journal of the American Planning Association 
61 (3): 365–85. 
Klüver, Heike. 2009. “Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text 
Analysis.” European Union Politics 10 (4): 535–49. 
Klüver, Heike. 2013. “Lobbying as a Collective Enterprise: Winners and Losers of 
Policy Formulation in the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 
20 (1): 59–76. 
Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry. 2003. “Extracting Policy 
Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data.” American Political Science 
Review 97 (2): 311–31. 
Leaf, Michel. 2005. “Modernity Confronts Tradition: The Professional Planner and 
Local Corporatism in the Building of China’s Cities.” In Comparative Planning 
Cultures, edited by Bishwapriya Sanyal, 91–111. New York: Taylor & Francis. 
Levy, John M. 2003. Contemporary Urban Planning, 6th ed. Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Li, Hongbin, and Li An Zhou. 2005. “Political Turnover and Economic 
Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China.” Journal of 
Public Economics 89 (9/10): 1743–62. 
List, John A., and Daniel M. Sturm. 2006. “How Elections Matter: Theory and 
Evidence from Environmental Policy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (4): 
1249–81. 
Lo, Carlos Wing-Hung, and Shui-Yan Tang. 2006. “Institutional Reform, Economic 
Changes, and Local Environmental Management in China: The Case of 
Guangdong Province.” Environmental Politics 15 (2): 190–210. 
Loh, Carolyn G., and Richard K Norton. 2013. “Planning Consultants’ Influence 
on Local Comprehensive Plans.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 79 
(2): 138–48. 
Lorentzen, Peter, Pierre Landry, and John Yasuda. 2010. “Transparent 
Authoritarianism? An Analysis of Political and Economic; Barriers to Greater 
Government Transparency in China.” UC Berkeley Working Paper. http://cega.
berkeley.edu/assets/cega_events/25/  
Lyles, Ward, and Mark Stevens. 2014. “Plan Quality Evaluation 1994-2012: Growth 
and Contributions, Limitations, and New Directions.” Journal of Planning 
Education and Research 34 (4): 433–50. 
Norton, Richard K. 2005. “Local Commitment to State-Mandated Planning in 
Coastal North Carolina.” Journal of the American Planning Association 25 (2): 
149–71. 
Norton, Richard K. 2008. “Using Content Analysis to Evaluate Local Master Plans 
and Zoning Codes.” Land Use Policy 25 (3): 432–54. 
Zhang et  al .  in  J.  of  Planning  Educ .  &  Res .  38  (2018)        27
Quinn, Kevin M., Burt L. Monroe, Michael Colaresi, Michael H. Crespin, and 
Dragomir R. Radev. 2010. “How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal 
Assumptions and Costs.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (1): 209–28. 
Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, and Brian Everitt. 2004. A Handbook of Statistical 
Analyses Using Stata Third Edition. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Ran, Ran. 2013. “Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap 
in China’s Local Environmental Politics.” Journal of Environmental Policy & 
Planning 15 (1): 17–39. 
Scott, David, and Fern Willits. 1994. “Environmental Attitudes and Behavior.” 
Environmental Behavior 26 (2): 239–61. 
Selden, Thomas M., and Daqing Song. 1995. “Neoclassical Growth, the J Curve for 
Abatement and the Inverted U Curve for Pollution.” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 29 (2): 162–68. 
Shen, Junyi. 2006. “A Simultaneous Estimation of Environmental Kuznets Curve: 
Evidence from China.” China Economic Review 17 (4): 383–94. 
Slapin, Jonathan B., and Sven-Oliver Proksch. 2008. “A Scaling Model for 
Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts.” American Journal of 
Political Science 52 (3): 705–22. 
Stevens, Mark R. 2013. “Evaluating the Quality of Official Community Plans in 
Southern British Columbia.” Journal of Planning Education and Research 33 (4): 
471–90. 
Tang, Zhenghong, and Samuel D. Brody. 2009. “Linking Planning Theories with 
Factors Influencing Local Environmental-Plan Quality.” Environment and 
Planning B: Planning and Design 36 (3): 522–37. 
Tang, Zhenghong, Samuel D. Brody, Ruopu Li, Courtney Quinn, and Nan Zhao. 
2011. “Examining Locally Driven Climate Change Policy Efforts in Three Pacific 
States.” Ocean and Coastal Management 54 (5):415–26. 
Tang, Zhenghong, Samuel D. Brody, Courtney Quinn, Liang Chang, and Ting Wei. 
2010. “Moving from Agenda to Action: Evaluating Local Climate Change Action 
Plans.” Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 53 (1): 41–62. 
Tao, Ran, Fubing Su, Mingxing Liu, and Guangzhong Cao. 2010. “Land Leasing 
and Local Public Finance in China’s Regional Development: Evidence from 
Prefecture-Level Cities.” Urban Studies 47 (10): 2217–36. 
Tian, Li, and Tiyan Shen. 2011. “Evaluation of Plan Implementation in the 
Transitional China: A Case of Guangzhou City Master Plan.” Cities 28 (1): 11–27. 
Tsui, Kai-yuen, and Youqiang Wang. 2004. “Between Separate Stoves and a Single 
Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China.” China Quarterly 177:71–90. 
Urwin, Kate, and Andrew Jordan. 2008. “Does Public Policy Support or 
Undermine Climate Change Adaptation? Exploring Policy Interplay across 
Different Scales of Governance.” Global Environmental Change 18 (1): 180–91. 
Wu, Fengshi. 2009. “Environmental Politics in China: An Issue Area in Review.” 
Journal of Chinese Political Science 14 (4): 383–406. 
Zhang et  al .  in  J.  of  Planning  Educ .  &  Res .  38  (2018)       28
Wu, Jing, Yongheng Deng, Jun Huang, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung. 2013. 
“Incentives and Outcomes: China’s Environmental Policy.” NBER Working 
Paper No. 1875. http://www.ires.nus.edu.sg/workingpapers/IRES2013-004.pdf  
Yu, Wei, Roberto Pagani, and Lei Huang. 2012. “CO2 Emission Inventories for 
Chinese Cities in Highly Urbanized Areas Compared with European Cities.” 
Energy Policy 47: 298–308. 
Zhang, Tingwei. 2002. “Planners in Transitional China.” Journal of Planning 
Education and Research 22 (1): 64–76. 
Zheng, Siqi, Matthew E. Kahn, Weizeng Sun, and Danglun Luo. 2014. “Incentives 
for China’s Urban Mayors to Mitigate Pollution Externalities: The Role of the 
Central Government and Public Environmentalism.” Regional Science and 
Urban Economics 47:61–71. 
• • • • •
The authors 
Lei Zhang is an associate professor in the Department of Urban Planning and Man-
agement, School of Public Administration and Public Policy, Renmin University of 
China. His research focuses on plan evaluation, development control, and urban 
informality. 
Rachel M. Tochen is a PhD candidate in the Department of Urban Planning and 
Management, School of Public Administration and Public Policy, Renmin University 
of China. Her research focuses on collaborative planning with a special interest in 
public participation and capacity building. 
Michael Hibbard is professor emeritus at the University of Oregon Department of 
Planning, Public Policy & Management. His research focuses on community and re-
gional development, with a special interest in the social impacts of economic change 
on small towns, Indigenous communities, and rural regions in the United States and 
other industrialized nations. 
Zhenghong Tang is an associate professor in the Community and Regional Plan-
ning Program at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. His major research interests 
address environmental planning, environmental modeling, hazard planning, and 
planning for geospatial-enabled society. 
